Green,+Derek

I debated in LD for three years at Lakeville Sr HS in Lakeville, MN. I then acted as an assistant coach on and off for the next few years. Currently, I coach students on a private basis, and I judge for Lakeville North and Lakeville South on occasion at major Midwestern tournaments. I'm also an instructor at the National Symposium for Debate.

My "Theory of LD" (entirely too grandiose a phrase): LD is a competitive activity. In most cases, I will adjust my paradigm if a debater successfully substantiates reasons to do so in the round. (Of course, these reasons must, in many cases, be judged against the pre-existing paradigm. There's no way for me to completely and accurately specify the conditions under which any such attempt to modify the paradigm will succeed. But, as the most obvious example of such a success: If someone completely extends a dropped argument that I should consider an argument in such-and-such a way, or that I should presume Neg, or that I should evaluate competing policy positions, then the argument succeeds.)

You can debate as fast as you want, but there are limitations to what I can flow and understand beyond a certain level of speed.

Most any type of position is fine, and I do listen to Theory (though I don't prefer it). I'll list anything that might be peculiar in the following: 1. I will only call cards if the debaters request that I do so. I ***very much prefer*** that all evidence evaluation/comparison be conducted in the round, but if you'd like me to confirm that a card says or does not say something and instruct me to read the card, that's cool 2. Cards must be comprehensible as they are presented in the round. (This is true of everything presented in round, actually.) 3. I will say "clear" or "speed" if I'm unable to keep track due to the factor cited. I'll likely have reason to say the former more than the latter, but the latter isn't unprecedented either. 5. All the links in a Theory argument must be clearly explained, as well as the reasoning for how the voter operates as the debater claims. 6. To emphasize what was said in the brief introductory note to the actual paradigm section of the paradigm, most any type of position is fine, "practical-political," philosophical, what have you. The same goes for the form of the argumentation. That said, I do default to considering the resolution as a truth-statement. I don't find "Competing Worlds" or "Competing Worlds in which the worlds differ in a policy that an agent of action adopts" terribly coherent in LD. (I buy the argument that we can only determine which world is preferable by establishing a standard for which world we should prefer. If by "Competing Worlds" a debater simply means "evaluate the aff/neg worlds and see which is better," then there still needs to be a standards debate to determine how I contrast the preferability of the two worlds.) That said, if a debater wins that I should evaluate through "Competing Worlds" as that's commonly understood, I'll do my best to reason within that paradigm.

6.1 -- Just to lay all my cards on the table, here's how I default on a number of paradigm issues... a. Means of Evaluating the Resolution -- Evaluation as a truth-statement. b. Presumption: Aff (I do so for fairness's sake.) c. Theory -- I prefer not to vote on it, but will listen. (I may deduct speaker points for disclosure theory. Given my paradigm, I tend to have high standards for "aff/neg must advocate plan".) The plausibility of the theory varies with the degree to which I think an actual or potential abuse is significant. d. RVIs -- fine e. Status of the Counterplan -- I prefer dispositional or unconditional counterplans. f. A-priori and/or "Philosophical" positions -- I'm a graduate student in a Philosophy program, so I definitely can't say no to these.

7. There is one exception to my general policy of "anything goes." A debater can't present a position without arguments for its framework in the first speech and justify the framework in the second speech. Affirmatives can defend "presuppositions of the resolution" in the 1AR, since it's obviously impossible for them to defend the indefinite number of facts any given resolution presupposes. That rationale does not justify presupposing a framework for evaluating the resolution in one speech, and then justifying that framework in the next.

HAVE FUN, PEOPLE